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National and international labour relations in oil and gas Trans National Corpora-
tions in Kazakhstan.   
 
Abstract 
The paper examines labour relations in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas TNCs, contributing to 
recent debates on the Global Union Federations’ (GUFs) and national unions’ roles in 
building a global system of industrial relations.  These debates suggest a need for GUFs 
to involve national unions in organisation within and dialogue with TNCs. The GUF 
considered here judged them insufficiently capable of this and they therefore had only 
limited involvement in GUF-led activities.  Theories of an emerging ‘global system of 
industrial relations’ must recognise such issues deriving from trade unionism’s global 
heterogeneity and the weak spots it creates within the emergent system.   
Keywords: Asia; labour relations; oil and gas industry. 
Introduction  
This article examines labour relations in Central Asia’s oil and gas TNCs, contributing 
to recent debates on the Global Union Federations’ and national unions’ roles in build-
ing an ‘emerging global industrial relations framework’ (Papadakis, 2008) or ‘global 
system of industrial relations’ (Fairbrother and Hammer, 2005).  These tend to use un-
ions from European, American and Japanese contexts as their default model of trade un-




Theorists of ‘union revitalization’ have essentially ignored Central Asia (see for exam-
ple the contributions to Frege and Kelly, 2004).  Conversely, otherwise excellent re-
search on Central Asian politics and society almost completely neglects labour and em-
ployment issues (Collins, 2006).  More broadly, very little research has been published 
on labour in these countries (for a marginal exception, see Borisov and Clarke, 2011).  
Previous accounts of Kazakh trade unionism have insufficiently located them within the 
context of their society; nor have they taken full account of the importance of their Sovi-
et legacy nature (see for example Klaveren et.al., 2010; ICTUR, 2005).  However, these 
countries’ extractive industries play a major role in supplying oil, gas and minerals to 
industry internationally and are therefore key to global capitalism’s operation.  They are 
also significant to the Global Union Federation the International Federation of Chemical, 
Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions: ICEM), now part of the merged GUF In-
dustriALL.  The ICEM, together with other GUFs, has focused for many years on estab-
lishing bargaining relationships with Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) globally. 
ICEM/IndustriALL, in common with other Global Union Federations, focuses its strate-
gy on TNCs (Platzer and Müller, 2009).  By examining relations between the ICEM, 
Kazakh unions and oil and gas TNCs, we contribute to debates about how GUFs and na-




The article is structured as follows.  We begin by outlining the regional context.  Subse-
quently we introduce the globalisation debate among industrial relations scholars, devel-
oping the research question and explaining the methods used here.  Next, we examine 
the Central Asian unions and their relations with the GUFs, with special reference to 
Kazakhstan.  We then discuss the 2011 revolt in the oil and gas industry and the unions’ 
role in it and we conclude by revisiting the research question and crystallising the arti-




The Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan are key locations for extractive TNCs.  From the early 1990s almost 
every large oil and gas company moved into the region. The overall stock of foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) in Central Asia increased from USD 1.435 million in 1992 to 
USD 119.279 million in 2011. Most of this went to Kazakhstan (78.49 per cent in 2011) 
(UNCTAD, 2012). Kazakhstan’s principal exports are oil and natural gas, long respon-
sible for almost half of the country’s foreign earnings (Kaser and Mehrotra, 1992, 
Rittmann, 2012).  
 
The Kazakh trade unions are conditioned by the society of which they are part. The Cen-
tral Asian states’ industries were ruled in Soviet times by a relatively devolved form of 
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hierarchy; interpersonal and patrimonial relations persisted after their relatively late se-
cession from the USSR (Cooley, 2005). Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbaev follows a 
policy similar to that of other élites on the ‘transitional periphery’ by emphasising conti-
nuity with the Soviet past, a policy that has extended to trade unions. A common feature 
of Central Asian polities has been ‘the establishment of super-presidential political sys-
tems under autocratic rulers’ (Pomfret, 2012: 400). Government structures in the region 
have been dominated since independence by representatives of the Soviet élite (Sievers, 
2003; Gleason, 2003; Murphy, 2006; Lane, 1996; Lasch and Dana, 2011).  In the Ka-
zakh case, traditional patrimonial relations also provided both social foundations and a 
means of legitimation for the new régime. Currently, as Minbaeva, Hutchings and 
Thompson (2007) illustrate, Kazakhstan (like the region’s other countries) exhibits a 
culture where the family unit and local origins are crucial and clientilism, associated 
with clan politics, deepened in the 1990s (Schatz, 2004). The political élites maintain 
strong economic and social connections to powerful local clans and oligarchic groupings.  
Clans have played a central role throughout post-independence Central Asia, and it has 
been argued by Collins (2006) that they are also responsible for the region’s failure to 
maintain the public goods provided by the Soviet regime while advancing their private 
interests.  Clans are informal, vertical, kinship-based, informal organisations which pro-
vided a means of reconstituting political and social relations during and beyond the fall 
of Communism in ways that became increasingly inimical to the interests of labour 
(Collins, 2006).        
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Labour law is embedded in this wider system of social relations; the weakness of imper-
sonal rules in employment relations is evident.  Őzkan suggests that faced by problems, 
instead of going to the courts Uzbek business people ‘would seek the help and advice of 
their influential and powerful relatives and friends’ (Özkan, 2010: 83).  In Transparency 
International’s Annual Corruption Report (2012), Central Asian countries continue to 
occupy low positions in the control of corruption, rule of law and judicial independence 
indices.  Moreover, unions’ legal rights steadily diminished during ‘transition’.  In Ka-
zakhstan, a 2000 revision of the Labour Code shifted employment relations to an essen-
tially individual basis by making only individual contracts mandatory; collective agree-
ments at all levels were from this point voluntary.  Unions right to prevent the termina-
tion of an individual’s contract was revoked (ICTUR, 2005).  Parliament is at the time of 
writing considering further restrictions both on civil liberties in general, such as the right 
of assembly, marches and freedom of expression; simultaneously,  the new trade union 
law prohibits such activities as enterprise unions or the basic level of union organisation 
by organisations without nation-wide status (Buketov, 2014).  In short, enterprise unions 
(which may potentially lead industrial action) are subordinated to the broader national 
organisations of which they are part (which are more subject to political influence).  
Thus, labour law has been continuously weakened although unions continue to resist 




In formal terms, the Kazakh unions could appear moderately well-placed to represent 
workers. The Federation of Trade Unions (FPRK), Kazakhstan’s majority trade union 
confederation, to which many industrial union federations affiliate, is the largest and 
most important confederation.  It does not provide consistent statistics for its member-
ship since it has only unreliable data from affiliates.  Klaveren et al (2010) estimate that 
overall, 50% of paid workers are unionised, although ICTUR (2005) offered a much 
lower estimate and membership has undoubtedly been falling recently in many indus-
tries (Klaveren et al, 2010).  In the oil, gas and chemical industries IndustriALL’s affili-
ated unions Kazhimprofsoyuz (chemicals) and Kazneftegazprofsoyuz (oil and gas) are 
agreed by respondents to have relatively high levels of union membership.  A number of 
small independent unions also exist but are marginalised by official unions and man-
agement.  An internal ICEM document of 2000 (ICEM, 2000) reported that the Kazakh 
union leaders saw themselves as well-ensconced within the national system. They erro-
neously viewed changes to labour law mooted in 1999 as aimed at their independent ri-
vals and were therefore complacent about them. At around this point, their colleagues in 
the Russian unions acted as a bridge from the Central Asian unions to the GUFs, en-
couraging the Central Asians to further improve their international links (Sogge, 2004).  
These unions’ apparently moderately strong membership and place within the system 
does not mean that individual employees are in a position to assert their rights.  Good 
employment opportunities are few and far between, the ‘informal economy’ is the nor-
mal locus for populations’ battle for survival, employment laws are rarely enforced and 
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work with TNCs is widely seen as a privilege (Muratbekova-Touron, 2002).   Excep-
tionally hierarchical and authoritarian management styles are generally unchallenged 
(Muratbekova-Touron, 2002). In larger companies, decision-making is concentrated 
among major shareholders and other stakeholders’ interests are largely ignored (Min-
baeva et al., 2007).  In short, employees have very little power.  For those physically ca-
pable of the work, exit to foreign countries, notably to Russian construction sites, repre-
sent relatively attractive options despite the racial discrimination they are likely to expe-
rience (Zayonchkovskaya, 2009)  
 
In the oil and gas industries, labour confronts sophisticated internationally-coordinated 
employers in which local states have major interests.  After independence, local political 
élites were highly reluctant to let foreign companies acquire too much control over natu-
ral resources promoting ethnic nationalism and associated ‘resource nationalism’ (Bin-
gol, 2004:44; see also Murphy, 2006 for a more detailed analysis of the Kazakh élite).  
On the other hand, they required (and continue to require) foreign companies’ technical 
expertise if resources were to be fully exploited.  They therefore pushed foreign compa-
nies to establish joint ventures with state-controlled or quasi-privatised companies, con-
glomerates and holding companies. In Kazakhstan, many foreign investment projects in 
extractive industries are conducted through joint ventures with state-owned agencies 
(KMG Exploration and Productions; KazMunaiTengiz, KazTransGaz, and KazTransOil), 
arms of the state-owned natural gas and oil company KMG.   IJVs are often favoured by 
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developing countries, but Kazakh policy is more stringent than in China, where although 
the government does not permit wholly-owned foreign company subsidiaries and IJVs 
are often used, alternative arrangements are more common.  The Kazakh state scrutinis-
es applications for TNC investment closely and is interventionist in its approach 
(Moldasheva, 2001).  On occasion, national élite interests may occasionally coincide 
with those of unions in which case government may act in their defence, thereby 
strengthening the latters’ emphasis on political action (see below).  Yet these IJVs have 
had long lives, and as evidence below indicates, they effectively provide access to local 
expertise in handling labour relations.   
 
In summary, the social, political and legal pressures on Kazakh trade unions have in-
creased since independence, weakening them in the face of powerful TNCs.  Both fac-
tors have increased their interest in the international level of trade unionism since they 
view them as potential means of enhancing their influence.    
 
The debate on GUFs, national unions and relations with TNCs. 
 
It was argued a decade ago that the GUFs were central actors in the construction of a 
global system of industrial relations (Fairbrother and Hammer, 2005).  From this per-
spective, the Global Unions were key to influencing TNCs’ activities in worker-friendly 
directions, notably through reaching  formal agreements with them. Other researchers 
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have allocated this type of regulation only a small role in the wider context of other ‘pri-
vate’ initiatives; those by campaigning NGOs and employer-led ‘CSR’ bodies on the 
one hand, and ‘public’ regulation by international organisations such as the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) and national governments on the other (Kolben, 2007).  
These various forms of regulation may operate in complementary and positive ways or, 
as other researchers have noted, condition a wide range of different outcomes, not all of 
them positive for workers (Lock et.al., 2013). As we outlined above, labour law applica-
tion in Kazakhstan has deteriorated.  If the GUFs and national trade unions play only 
marginal roles, labour regulation is likely to be extremely weak since it will reflect low 
levels of regulation in both spheres. The Kazakh unions have long been aware of this 
and wish for international intervention to support their weak position (ICEM, 2006).    
 
It has been suggested that Global Union Federations may exert influence on TNCs in 
various ways.  There has been considerable and growing interest in the conclusion by 
GUFs of agreements with TNCs variously described as International (or alternatively, 
Global) Framework Agreements (IFAs).  These are essentially repetitions of certain core 
ILO standards, notably those in favour of freedom of association and collective bargain-
ing, together with undertakings that companies will follow national law. Niforou (2012) 
points out that since precedence is normally given to local law within these agreements, 
the enforcement of rights can be difficult if not impossible, undermining claims that 
IFAs can constitute effective tools in securing employees’ positions.  Unions’ capacity 
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to operate beyond simple ‘legal watchdog’ functions (a strong tradition in Kazakh un-
ions) is therefore very relevant to their effectiveness.   Others prefer to view the agree-
ments in a wider context of dialogue between GUFs and TNCs; in this perspective, their 
purpose is to allow local unionists to organise and bargain while GUFs ‘hold the ring’ 
for them through dialogue with companies drawing on TNCs’ need for international le-
gitimacy (Croucher and Cotton, 2011).  Nevertheless, despite reservations, these agree-
ments continue to be viewed positively by all of the industrial relations scholars cited, as 
providing local unions with opportunities to organise within signatory companies. In-
deed it has been argued that their importance has been understated.  From this perspec-
tive, if unions can leverage issues of  particular importance to TNCs such as product or 
service quality, labour issues can acquire increased salience with them and greater gains 
can be achieved for workers (Williams et al, 2013).  Thus, the clear consensus is that 
IFAs and indeed wider dialogue with TNCs are opportunities for local activists to nego-
tiate with companies and organise workers to put pressure on them. This assumes that 
local unions have orientations and structures that permit them to do so.   
 
How GUFs can assist local unions to organise within TNCs and bargain effectively with 
them has also been discussed.  Some researchers have stressed the significance of inter-
nal GUF and union relations in determining IFAs’ effectiveness (Dehnen, 2013).  Power 
relations between unions operating in the global heartlands of trade unionism, especially 
in Europe, and the relatively resource-poor GUFs, can assume major significance.  Eu-
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ropean trade unions, when operating in conjunction with others in European Works 
Councils, have occasionally sought to extend their influence both with TNCs and the 
GUFs themselves, in the ways that they have negotiated IFAs with companies (Dehnen, 
2013).  The GUFs, as advocates and guardians of global trade unionism and industrial 
relations more widely, have historically sought to address power imbalances within the 
international trade union movement.  However, these imbalances are also reflected in the 
GUFs themselves: their structures favour the unions of the developed world who con-
tribute most to their funding and governance (Croucher and Cotton, 2011).  The GUFs 
have long addressed this tension through educational activities designed to share infor-
mation, transfer expertise and build trans-national solidarity.  Long-term workers’ edu-
cational activities, designed to build international and indeed national organizing, mobi-
lising and negotiating capacities, have proved effective both within and beyond the Rus-
sian-speaking world (Croucher, 2004; Sogge, 2004; Cotton and Royle, 2014).  However, 
a consideration stressed by Croucher and Cotton (2011) is vital here: a resource-based 
view of GUFs’ capacities strongly suggests that they have to take increasingly difficult 
decisions about where to allocate their limited resources.  These decisions are informed 
by assessments of the amount of progress they are likely to make in any given interna-
tional context.   
 
Thus, the debates surrounding the construction of a ‘global system’ generate questions 
about the extent to which GUFs are major players within it, as well as about the effec-
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tiveness of IFAs and the significance of internal relations within the international trade 
union movement.  Kazakhstan is a suitable context for examining all of them precisely 
because it raises the question of whether GUF influence may have significant limits in 
certain regions despite their strategic importance within global capitalism, due to the 
specific nature of trade unionism there.  Recent literature documents international union 
efforts to improve organising and bargaining capacities. Yet, in global terms, the ‘varie-
ties of unionism’ (Frege and Kelly, 2005) are not limited to those of Europe and the An-
glo-Saxon world, nor to those with significant organising and collective bargaining ori-
entations which attract almost exclusive attention in the ‘union renewal’ discourse.  
 
In this context, we ask: How did the ICEM perceive and impact oil and gas workers un-
ions’ capacities to represent workers in TNCs operating in Kazakhstan? 
 
Method 
In so far as the research involved direct investigation of the Kazakh unions and of their 
relations with the GUFs, the method was participant observation.  The author was in-
volved as an educator with the ICEM and other GUFs from 1995 until 2010 and was 
implicated in project planning, investigations into unions and conducting numerous 
workshops both in Russia and Central Asia.  He draws here on extensive research diaries 
of the preparation, implementation and evaluation of workshop events and their impact 
on unions across the fifteen year period.  The diaries recorded information on unions, 
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industrial relations, interactions and immediate evaluations in chronological order.  The 
use of such diaries to record and analyse interactions with participants both outside and 
inside educational settings is analysed and advocated by Altrichter and Holly (2005) and 
by Engin (2011), who argues that such diaries provide tools for ‘scaffolding’ the crea-
tion of understanding.  In Central Asia, the educational activities reached a peak in 
2004-6.  Although this is a relatively long period for a research project and considerable 
change might be expected during it, the main changes were contextual and the overall 
story was one of organisational stasis. The author had regular discussion with GUF offi-
cials at all levels from General Secretary downwards and access to extensive documen-
tation on GUF strategy and local union structures.   These documents provide unique in-
sights into the ICEM’s perceptions of the unions.   
 
English and Russian language literature and government, company and NGO websites 
were also used, supplemented by notes on interviews conducted by the author in 2006.  
Fifteen semi-structured interviews were carried out to deepen the data available on per-
ceptions of the Central Asian unions.  Respondents were selected to offer a wider view 
of the unions and the context in which they operated.  Three interviews were with Ka-
zakh government officials, four with company representatives from major extractive 
companies and the remainder with national trade union officers and officials of all of the 
Global Union Federations involved in the Six GUFs project (see below).  Questions 
asked of the government officials focused on their perceptions of continuity and change 
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in the unions as they have regular interactions with them and are well-informed external 
observers at the national level.  Questions posed to the extractive companies pursued the 
same theme but at the company and industrial and in terms of industrial relations.  Ques-
tions asked of the GUF officials pursued the continuity and change theme, but centred in 
this case on union organisational structures and cultures, as well as on the interactions 
between the GUFs and unions.    Interviews were conducted in English and Russian (the 
latter with the assistance of an experienced Russian trade union interpreter who was very 
familiar with the national, union and GUF contexts) and recorded exclusively by written 
notes at respondent request.  These were analysed manually, and interview notes were 
coded thematically through the lenses of two key themes: national union structural and 
cultural continuity and change on the one hand and the evolution of unions’ relations 
with other institutional actors and their own members on the other.         
 
Kazakh Trade Unions and the ICEM 
 
In this section, the analysis is based on GUF documents, ICEM and other respondents’ 
views of the unions, supplemented by other sources.   Some context on the regional 
GUF officials and their milieu is required at this point.   The GUF regional officers were 
part of a small, tight-knit group who all had their bases in Moscow and interacted on a 
more or less daily basis.  Indeed, the funders of the ‘6 GUFs’ project regarded the degree 
of cooperation between them as a very positive aspect of that project.  In the case of the 
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ICEM, their regional officer collaborated especially closely with his counterpart for the 
IUF precisely because there was little or no industrial competition for members or affili-
ates between the two GUFs.  They in turn were highly influential among the other GUF 
officers and tended to shape views of the Central Asian unions, on which there was a re-
al lack of information.  The result was a high degree of consistency among GUF views 
of the Central Asian unions from 2000 on.    
  
An internal ICEM document produced by a highly experienced expert had summed up 
the situation in Kazakhstan in 2000.  This confidential and perceptive strategy statement 
(ICEM, 2000) is worth quoting in extenso because of its author’s intimate acquaintance 
with the unions concerned and his probably unique overview.  It began by characterising 
the country as an ‘oriental type of society’ in which the ‘democracy’ concept had little 
real meaning.  It went on to describe the need to reform these unions as ‘the most vital 
necessity’ because of the local importance of TNCs and the high level of Western inter-
est and management methods in the country, noting that some leaders and activists al-
ready saw a need for change.  As other GUF respondents later noted, the many older 
leaders with short personal time horizons feared retaliation from employers if they sig-
nalled less conciliatory, organising and bargaining approaches. The document proceeded 




‘The bulk of the dues remain in the hands of the local organisations which use them for 
so-called ‘material assistance’ (when somebody is asking for some money for kids, to 
buy goods or for the funeral etc.)……Local organisations do not have real motives to 
recruit more members, as they will have slightly more money, but progressively more 
headache….’ (ICEM 2000). 
 
Therefore, the author argued, enterprise organisations had little reason to affiliate to the 
national union federation at all, clearly decreasing the latter’s influence.  In the context 
of their common lack of bargaining function, this increased their vulnerability to com-
pany influence and to their becoming, (in local parlance throughout the Former Soviet 
Union ‘yellow unions’, i.e. the term does not refer specifically to Asian unions)  or em-
ployer-driven bodies.  It also created the possibility of increasingly prevalent ‘company 
unions’ linking up or, as the document put it, ‘creation of the company unions under the 
name of interregional…..and even international……’  Thus, companies sought to influ-
ence rather than abolish official unions as the companies ‘appreciate controllable com-
pany unions in general, while many regional leaders in oil and gas sector already made 
so much money, that they can afford to buy nice apartments in Moscow…..’.  In the Ka-
zakh case, they also potentially acted, as the document’s author put it, to ‘block the de-
velopment of independent unions which although few and small are also very active’ 




The same ICEM internal document proceeded to show in detail how the process of de-
veloping company unions by separating them from the national unions applied in the 
Kazakh instance.  The TengizChevroil Company signed a collective agreement with 
three of its unions in 1999, at least two of which were company unions in the author’s 
view.  This consolidated the local enterprise unions’ internal company positions and 
marginalised other union levels, threatening the national union’s inter-level integration.  
In other cases, ‘Western companies not capable of directly organising yellow (sic) un-
ions try to undermine relations and connections between the local unions and their re-
gional and national offices (Chevron in Kazakhstan). (parentheses in original—author)’ 
(Ibid.).  The quotation shows how Western companies were felt to have insufficient lo-
cal knowledge and networks to adopt sophisticated and well-tailored solutions to prob-
lems and therefore potentially benefited from IJVs.   
  
All of the GUF respondents agreed that this picture remained essentially accurate five 
years later.  The Kazakh unions had discussed change, but had taken few steps towards 
initiating it, essentially remaining Soviet-style unions with top-down bureaucratic struc-
tures reliant on management patronage.  They nevertheless also had strong political ori-
entations and a clear view of the need to represent Kazakh workers’ interests in relation 
to government and TNCs.  The GUF respondents argued that enterprise unions had 
shown some capacity to bargain on a few occasions, an assessment confirmed by com-
pany respondents. Equally, all agreed that the unions essentially saw a need to become 
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more representative bodies with greater capacity to involve, represent and mobilise 
members.  Nevertheless, the FPRK union leaders were often from Soviet times when 
leaders were appointed by the party and their three basic functions therefore continued 
to be seen as: first, government-oriented political action (including through national tri-
partite structures), second, legal watchdog functions and third, worker welfare through 
the direct distribution of ‘material support’ to workers in particular need at workplace 
level.  Indeed, the unions themselves claimed some gains for workers by 2005, notably 
improved health and safety insurance laws and improved disbursements to people in-
jured at work. These gains, however, were marginal for most workers and the many le-
gal cases brought against foreign companies for refusing to sign collective agreements 
brought only patchy results.   
  
Members’ subscriptions were largely retained at enterprise level with only relatively 
small amounts being (inconsistently and irregularly) sent to regional and national levels, 
leading to high levels of disarticulation between different union levels and the consider-
able isolation of many workplace organisations.  At all levels, collective agreements 
could be reached.  These are normally legalistic documents which take formulaic and 
declaratory forms and are not underpinned by meaningful bargaining or substantial mon-
itoring processes.  Often the collective agreements at enterprise level were (and continue 
to be) concluded by non-union bodies such as the legally-recognised ‘labour collective’.  
One result was that at most foreign enterprises, no collective agreements existed and 
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where they did they were not concluded by independent unions; an internal GUF report 
ascribed this situation to an unprincipled and over-conciliatory stance by union leaders 
taken to preserve their weak positions with management (ICEM, 2006).  However, the 
Kazakh oil workers’ union had shown some local capacity to bargain and to access the 
ICEM’s assistance. In 2005 the ICEM had successfully supported Kazakh negotiators in 
dealing with recalcitrant Canadian management in Petrokazakhstan by organising a soli-
darity demonstration in Windsor Canada, bringing pay increases.  GUF respondents ar-
gued that success was achieved because the Canadians were by this point out of favour 
with the Kazakh state-owned companies.  They were soon replaced by Chinese partners.  
Thus, the circumstances were unusually favourable to the union and the incident was 
viewed as an exceptional one which did not contradict the broader picture.    
 
The conclusion of a Global Framework Agreement between the Russian Oil and Gas 
Workers’ Union (ROGWU) and the Russian oil major Lukoil might be interpreted as an 
opportunity for organisational change in Kazakh unions. However, in global terms, this 
is not and was not seen by any respondent as a ‘typical’ GFA in terms of facilitating im-
proved bargaining and mobilising in Kazakhstan.  Lukoil, the author of the ICEM (2000) 
document suggested, was happy to ‘make a deal, no conflicts—no hard collective bar-
gaining; I will give you money and you will arrange your own international contacts and 
trips….’. Therefore, Lukoil management, together with union leadership in Russia, 
(Russian Oil and Gas Workers’ Union –ROGWU) was happy to sign a Global Frame-
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work Agreement in 2004. The Russian élite exercises considerable influence in Lukoil 
as in all natural resources companies, while the union has representation at the highest 
level within the company: this is a company-level manifestation of ‘illusory corporatism’ 
(Ost, 2000).  Even before the Global Framework Agreement with ROGWU, the compa-
ny (along with Yukos) created a regional association between the Russian and Central 
Asian unions, which ‘unfortunately looks very attractive in the eyes of the ambitious lo-
cal and regional officers….’ (ICEM, 2000).  The GFA, signed some five years later, ex-
tended existing Russian ‘social partnership’ arrangements between ROGWU and Lukoil 
to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.  It was reported by GUF respondents to have under-
pinned ROGWU’s position in the ICEM and, simultaneously, its influence with its Cen-
tral Asian counterparts. The agreement was, at least in formal terms, relatively advanced, 
containing a clause binding the company to adhere to it wherever it had ‘full control’; 
elsewhere it would simply ‘exercise its best efforts’ to make other companies aware of 
its agreement, and to secure compliance.  The IJV is arguably a case where the company 
lacks full control.  GUF respondents argued that it was consistent with ensuring tradi-
tional Soviet-style industrial relations persisted in Central Asian units.  It arguably de-
creased the ICEM’s influence on the unions as the company showed its willingness to 
‘substitute’ for the GUF by providing cross-border contact and foreign travel.   Thus, far 
from creating possibilities for Central Asian unions to become more independent, it was 
seen as reducing them.  Neither the joint action against the Canadians nor the Lukoil 
GFA were seen by the ICEM as changing the overall picture.        
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The GUFs’ reform efforts in Central Asia 
In this section, we use the author’s notes on his involvement with GUF activities, sup-
plemented by other named sources. The Global Union Federations and in particular the 
ICEM, had been in contact with Central Asian unions from the early 1990s onwards, be-
coming well-informed about their structures and activities.  From 1994, funded by the 
Dutch FNV Mondial, the ICEM and IUF—traditional partner GUFs because of the lack 
of overlap and hence competition between their affiliates’ membership bases—launched 
educational activities in Eastern Europe designed to assist unions to restructure to cope 
with major change.  Central Asian unions were consciously relegated to a future in 
which Eastern Europe and then Russia and Ukraine had been essentially dealt with.  For 
the GUFs, unions needed to be ready to undertake reform; despite some demands from 
affiliates and indeed non-affiliates, the GUFs made careful judgements both collectively 
and individually about which unions should be invited to become involved.  
 
The central Asian unions had only marginal involvement in a major four-year effort by 
the international trade union movement to facilitate union re-structuring in the Russian-
speaking world begun in 2004.  As we indicated above, the Global Union Federations 
judged them to be insufficiently capable of reform to merit full access to the project’s 
resources.  The initiative was conducted by six (originally five) Global Union Federa-
tions led by the ICEM and IUF—the first time in their long history that so many GUFs 
had co-operated in this way-- and was designed to consolidate tentative changes made 
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over the previous decade (Sogge, 2004).  Central Asian and Kazakh unions had some 
small involvement but this was limited to creating a cadre of union educators.  The edu-
cational work was to use the collective learning methods described in detail in Croucher 
and Cotton (2011) to identify and solve members’ problems by involving them.  They 
drew on a handbook created by Moldovan union educators (‘The union: past, present 
and future’) designed to allow unions to locate themselves within an evolutionary pro-
cess to transform soviet-style unions.   
 
The accuracy of ICEM perceptions of unions was tested through the educational project.  
During a project workshop involving the Kazakh unions held in 2007, senior union offi-
cials were asked to apply an organisational analysis tool to their unions.  All officials 
saw a need for change.  However, they also drew attention to an important basis on 
which they argued the existing form of unionism rested: older workers’ expectations of 
appropriate union functions, notably offering material assistance and legal aid. Asked to 
identify ways in which they might change, their prescriptions were generally compatible 
with existing modus operandi and cultures.  They called for ‘competent, well-trained 
leaders’ and ‘better information about companies’.  They also expressed a desire for im-
proved educational systems and increased educational resources.  Yet this begged the 
question of the nature of that education, their traditional educational activity having been 
limited to top-down information giving. There were also general calls for the existing 
structures to be re-organised and for members’ subscriptions to be allocated in different 
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ways.  National leaders called for the size and frequency of subscription income coming 
from enterprise organisations to be increased; only in this way, the national officials ar-
gued, could the union pay realistic subscriptions to the ICEM and exercise a strategic 
role at national level.  Enterprise unions remained sceptical of the national union leaders’ 
rhetoric however and were reluctant to increase their contributions to those at regional 
and national levels. Conceptions of a more ‘organising’ approach introduced by GUF 
participants were received with interest.  However, it was also noticeable that these ideas 
were not explored by participants.  Several participants said they needed time to think 
through their applicability to the Central Asian context (author’s notes of workshop held 
in Bishkek, March 2007).  Overall, the local unions’ discourses tended to support ICEM 
perceptions of the unions as unlikely to reform soon.    
 
The educational and organisational processes undertaken by the GUFs in Russia and 
Ukraine have been judged by external bodies, including the Federation of European 
Employers, to have considerably improved Russian and Ukrainian unions’ organising 
and bargaining capacities (Croucher and Cotton, 2011).  By contrast, in the case of the 
central Asian unions, another internal document produced for all six GUFs argued that 
‘There is a number of specific problems (sic) in the region of Central Asia that are in-
herent only to this region.  These include obsolete and out-of-date union structures, on 
the one hand, and lack of trade union culture, on the other….trade unions are often una-
ble to act promptly and adequately to the changes (sic)……’ (6 GUFs, 2008).  In the 
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subsequent GUF project in the Russian-speaking world, designed to create and upgrade 
networks of activists in TNCs, it is therefore unsurprising that activists from the Kazakh 
unions were only marginally involved.   
 
The Kazakh unions and the 2011 labour revolt in oil and gas 
Here, detailed publications on the labour revolt of 2011 are the primary source.  Kazakh 
unions have remained largely unreformed and did not lead significant industrial conflicts 
in 2011.  In that year, a dramatic revolt occurred in an unprecedented wave of strikes in 
oil facilities in Western Kazakhstan.  These included a seven month-long strike involv-
ing thousands of workers over low pay in KarazhanbasMunai, a Kazakh-Chinese joint 
venture in the Kazakh oil industry.  Their low pay reflected a lack of effective collective 
bargaining (Rittmann, 2012).  The strikes were led by small independent trade unions 
and unofficial leaders, ignored by companies.  Numerous violations of workers’ and 
trade union rights supposedly guaranteed by national law were documented by Human 
Rights Watch (Rittmann, 2012).  On 16 December, 2011, twelve people were shot dead 
and many others wounded when police opened fire on strikers.  According to the senior 
IUF official Kirill Buketov, the strikes marked a turning point in Kazakh employment 
relations in that violent and unlawful repression had become the norm rather than the 
exception.  The government sentenced a number of strike leaders to imprisonment and 
other penalties, for ‘promoting social unrest’ (Rotmann and Williamson, 2012).  The 
opposition politician Vladimir Lozlov was tried for his involvement; it is significant that 
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a politician rather than a union leader was singled out in this way.  The government 
clearly identified essentially ‘unofficial’ strike leaders and an outside politician rather 
than the official trade unionists as responsible for leading the unrest.  Three TNCs in-
volved in IJVs were judged by Human Rights Watch to have denied workers’ rights in 
many areas; some two thousand workers were dismissed for participating in the strikes 
(Rittmann, 2012; Buketov, 2014). The strike demonstrated a central feature of the na-
tional situation in the oil and gas industry: unprecedented worker unrest was insuffi-
ciently well-articulated and represented by the formal institutions of employee represen-
tation.  The Russian trade unions and indeed the international trade union movement 
more widely expressed dissatisfaction with the official Kazakh unions’ conduct during 
the strike.  The President of the Russian Confederation of Labour Boris Kravchenko 
spoke critically of them in Western Europe and was supported by others when he sug-
gested publicly that the striking oil workers had been left without any support by the 
Kazakh national unions (Rittmann, 2012).   
 
Conclusion 
The research question was: How did the ICEM perceive and impact oil and gas workers 
unions’ capacities to represent workers in TNCs operating in Kazakhstan?  
Before answering the question directly, the limitations of the research must first be 
acknowledged.  Although the ICEM relies heavily on its regional officials to inform its 
headquarters’ (then in Brussels) views of unions at national level, the views of the most 
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senior officials, the General Secretary and his close associates were not formally re-
searched through structured interviews.  Further research could fruitfully investigate the 
process of collective opinion-forming both within and between the GUFs about the un-
ion situation in different regions and how regional views interact with headquarters’ in-
terests to shape these.   
 
The first part of the research question, on perceptions, may be answered fairly simply: 
the ICEM perceived them as essentially soviet-style unions which emphasised élite po-
litical activity in preference to developing mobilising capacities.  The specificities re-
ferred to by Buketov (2014) may be, as he suggested, principally related to their roots in 
Kazakh society.   The further question nevertheless remains of how far the GUF’s per-
ceptions were justified by the evidence.  It might be argued that they were unjustified 
since all of the problems identified with the Kazakh unions would have been applicable 
at an equivalent point in their development to many other unions, for example in Azer-
baijan (Croucher and Cotton, 2011) .  The Kazakh unions had been prepared on at least 
one occasion to take a bargaining stance with the Canadian employers, they had enjoyed 
some success through political action and they had (after an initial naïve mis-perception 
that they would affect independent unions rather than their own) steadfastly opposed 
negative legal changes.  However, these empirical foundations are too weak to serve as a 
basis for generalisation about these unions’ capacity to reform.  The 2007 workshop re-
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vealed that the Kazakh unions demonstrated little interest in undertaking fundamental 
reform.  
 
The answer to the second part of the question is less problematic: GUF interventions 
have only minimally affected these unions’ capacity to mobilise workers.  By mid-2014 
the Kazakh unions remain largely unreformed.  The ‘Soviet’ nature of the official unions 
is broadly similar to that of unions in the ‘transitional periphery’ more widely. Most of 
these unions appear locked into broader polities that constitute hostile environments for 
organising forms of trade unionism. Meanwhile, Kazakh unions have been involved in a 
desperate rearguard action to defend their rights to operate in the political and legal are-
nas and this has proved highly distracting to their expressed wish to embark on reform.  
As the GUFs prosecute their activities in TNCs in the Russian-speaking world, these un-
ions remain marginal to them despite the GUFs’ recognition of the region as important 
to global capitalism.  As Cooley (2005) noted in relation to the international financial 
institutions and international NGOs’ interventions in Central Asia, national specificities 
meant that they had little or no impact.  In this sense, the GUFs were not unique.   
 
The experience allows reflection on the notion of a ‘global system’.  Unions internation-
ally are very heterogeneous in their functions, which do not necessarily include organis-
ing, mobilising workers or bargaining.  Thus, the existence of a GFA such as that be-
tween Lukoil, ROGWU and the ICEM cannot be seen as making such an approach more 
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likely in Central Asia and in some senses positively prevented that. More importantly, 
because of the weak spots arising in some parts of the world, any global system of in-
dustrial relations is unlikely to achieve comprehensive coverage within key TNCs and, 
while international in scope, may not fully justify the ‘global’ description.  Thus, the 
significance of the GUFs as actors in building any ‘global system’ of labour regulation 
may be limited and the relatively small interest in them by some labour regulation com-
mentators may to that extent be justified.  
 
The GUFs nevertheless have potential to impose themselves as more than bit players in 
international labour regulation.  Experience in Eastern Europe has shown that external 
intervention is required to reform unions; GUFs, because of their unique expertise, are 
capable of leading projects to change this situation.  However, several preconditions 
would have to be met: first, that the unions involved are willing and ready to make ma-
jor strategic changes in their organisation and indeed their entire collective thinking via 
long-term projects; second, that the GUFs agree that this is the case; third, that the GUFs 
have adequate resources available to undertake the major initiatives required.  The latter 
condition would require major changes in their human resources and funding models 
that would be difficult for funders and key affiliates to deliver and which appear unlikely 
to be met in the near future.  In short, the decline of trade union resources in the devel-
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